Ginger and I discuss her book Are You Sure? The Unconscious Origins of Certainty, which summarizes Richard Burton’s work exploring the experience and phenomenal origin of feeling confident, and how the vast majority of our brain processing occurs outside our conscious awareness.
Megan and I discuss her work using metacognition as a way to study subjective awareness, or confidence. We talk about how our decisions are related to our confidence, the current state of the science of consciousness, and her newest project using fMRI decoded neurofeedback to induce particular brain states in subjects so we can learn about conscious and unconscious brain processing.
Mazviita and I discuss the growing divide between prediction and understanding as neuroscience models and deep learning networks become bigger and more complex. She describes her non-factive account of understanding, which among other things suggests that the best predictive models may deliver less understanding. We also discuss the brain as a computer metaphor, and whether it’s really possible to ignore all the traditionally “non-computational” parts of the brain like metabolism and other life processes.
Patrick and I mostly discuss his path from a technician in the then nascent Jim DiCarlo lab, through his graduate school and two postdoc experiences, and finally landing a faculty position, plus the culture and issues in academia in general. We also cover plenty of science, like the role of eye movements in the study of vision, the neuroscience (and concept of) attention, what Patrick thinks of the deep learning hype, and more.
Brad and I discuss his battle-tested, age-defying cognitive model for how we learn concepts by forming and rearranging clusters, how the model maps onto brain areas, and how he’s using deep learning models to explore how attention and sensory information interact with concept formation. We also discuss the cognitive modeling approach, Marr’s levels of analysis, the term “biological plausibility”, emergence and reduction, and plenty more.
